This paper investigates the effects of health insurance and new antiviral treatments on HIV testing rates among the U.S. general population using nationally representative data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS) for the years 1993 to 2002. We estimate recursive bivariate probit models with insurance coverage and HIV testing as the dependent variables. We use changes in Medicaid eligibility and distribution of firm size over time within a state as instruments for insurance coverage. The results suggest that (a) insurance coverage increases HIV testing rates, (b) insurance coverage increases HIV testing rates more among the high risk population, and (c) the advent of Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) increases the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing for high risk populations.
Introduction
The number of uninsured Americans has risen steadily during the last decade. In 1999, about 40 million Americans lacked health insurance, and in 2009 more than 50 million were uninsured. The recent economic downturn has exacerbated the problem with the number of uninsured rising even more rapidly compared to historical trends with 6 million more uninsured since 2007. Health care reform in the U.S. seeks to reverse this trend by providing subsidies for insurance coverage to low income persons and by creating insurance exchanges to promote competition among health insurers. This naturally raises the question: How will changes in uninsurance affect the health of Americans now and in the future? It is well understood that lack of health insurance can affect health status by reducing access to treatment, especially new and expensive treatments (Bhattacharya, Goldman and Sood 2003; Card, Dobkin and Maestas 2008; Card, Dobkin and Maestas 2009 ). However, it is less clear how uninsurance affects health related behaviors which might affect long term population health. In this paper, we seek to investigate this issue in the context of HIV/AIDS-a disease that has claimed more than half a million lives in the U.S. and about 25 million lives worldwide. CDC estimates that approximately 50,000 people are newly infected with HIV each year in the United States.
There are several reasons that make HIV/AIDS an interesting case study for examining the effects of health insurance on population health and health related behaviors. First, insurance coverage might have competing effects on health and health related behaviors in the context of HIV. On one hand, insurance coverage saves lives by improving access to expensive but efficacious HIV treatments (Bhattacharya, Goldman and Sood 2003) . On the other hand, insurance coverage might increase the spread of HIV by increasing risky sexual behavior among the HIV positive (Lakdawalla, Sood and Goldman 2006) . However, prior work does not address how insurance coverage might affect HIV testing rates, a question we address in the current paper. Second, new but expensive treatments for HIV -Highly Active Antiretroviral Therapy (HAART) -were introduced in the mid-1990s.
The introduction of HAART allows us to understand how the effects of insurance coverage on health related behavior are influenced by health care innovation. In particular, we study how the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing differed in the pre-and post-HAART era. Finally, changes in HIV testing rates induced by changes in health insurance might have significant externalities in terms of changing the dynamics of the HIV epidemic. Thus, the results of the analysis are relevant for understanding the welfare implications of government-financed health insurance expansions in the U.S. as well as in several African countries ravaged by HIV.
We estimate recursive bivariate probit models with insurance coverage and HIV testing as the dependent variables. We use changes in Medicaid eligibility and distribution of firm size over time within a state as instruments for insurance coverage. The validity of these instrumental variables is discussed in detail in section 4 and section 5. The results suggest that insurance coverage increases HIV testing among both the high risk and low risk populations. The results also suggest that the advent of HAART increases the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing for high risk populations but lowers the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing for low risk populations.
Overall these results suggest that insurance coverage has the potential to have significant effects on health related behaviors. The paper also contributes to literature on the economic epidemiology of HIV. Past work has shown that increased insurance coverage save lives and improves welfare of the infected by improving access to HIV treatment. The results from this paper show that insurance coverage might also have long term effects on welfare of the current uninfected by altering HIV testing rates and hence the dynamics of the epidemic. The results of this paper also add to our understanding of the motivations for HIV testing. For example, a recent paper in this field uses data from a randomized experiment to show that small financial incentives or subsidies for HIV testing can have significant effects on HIV testing rates in poor countries (Thornton 2008) . Our results suggest that HIV testing rates can not only be improved by subsidizing HIV testing but also by improving access to treatment.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the conceptual framework; Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation of the empirical model; Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
Conceptual Framework
To examine the potential implications of insurance on HIV testing, one needs to understand the potential benefits and costs for HIV testing or not testing. Prior work suggests two benefits from testing (Tomas J. Philipson and Posner 1995) . First, HIV testing is a way to signal quality or HIV negative status to potential partners in the market for mutually beneficial sexual trades. Signaling HIV negative status might enable a person to attract a greater number of sexual partners. Second, HIV testing is motivated by the desire to seek early treatment -if a person knows that he is infected then he can start treatment early. Finally, sometimes HIV testing is required for purposes of employment or for health related purposes such as donating blood.
Insurance coverage can affect HIV testing rates through several pathways. First, for individuals seeking to test because of a desire to start HIV treatment, testing is more valuable when treatment costs are lower. Since insured consumers face lower treatment costs than uninsured consumers they enjoy greater benefit from testing.
That is, for individuals seeking to test because of a desire to start HIV treatment, testing is more valuable when treatment costs say $2,000 rather than $15,000.
Second, insurance might encourage testing by reducing the monetary costs of testing as insurance plans might offer free or subsidized testing services to their beneficiaries. Third, insurance likely increases contacts with the health care system and therefore increases the chance that a doctor or nurse recommends HIV testing.
The effects of insurance on HIV testing likely depend on the risk status of persons getting tested. High risk individuals are more likely to test positive compared to low risk individuals. Those who test positive primarily benefit from testing due to initiation of treatment. Since insurance reduces HIV treatment costs it might increase the value of testing more for high risk individuals since they are more likely to test positive and thus more likely to enjoy the benefits of lower treatment costs.
High risk individuals are also more likely to increase sexual activity in response to a negative test result. The reasoning is that the signaling value of a negative HIV test is higher for high risk individuals compared to low risk individuals. In other words, high risk individuals are more likely to be surprised by a negative test result and therefore more likely to alter sexual behavior in response to a negative test result (Boozer and Philipson 2000) . Low risk individuals expect to be HIV negative and thus a negative test result is unlikely to change behavior. The consequent increase in sexual activity among high risk might increase the risk of future HIV infection and thus increase expected HIV treatment costs. Since insurance subsidizes treatment costs it might again affect incentives for testing more for high risk individuals.
Finally, increased contact with doctors and nurses due to insurance is more likely to affect high risk individuals. High risk individuals might be more likely to use health care and doctors or nurses are more likely to recommend HIV testing to high risk individuals.
New treatments that are effective but expensive might mediate the effects of insurance coverage on incentives for HIV testing in complex ways. New expensive treatments increase the value of subsidized treatments available through insurance.
That is an insurance policy that covers 80% of treatment costs is more valuable if treatment costs $15,000 rather than $5,000. This implies that the effect of insurance on HIV testing would increase with the advent of new expensive treatments such as HAART. However, new treatments also reduce the signaling value of a negative test as potential partners are less worried about getting infected. This implies a smaller increase in the risk of infection and decreased expected burden of future infections.
Thus, if the reduction in signaling value dominates then new treatments might reduce the effect of insurance on HIV testing. Again the effects might be heterogeneous and depend on the risk of infection or the probability of testing positive.
Our empirical model is motivated by the theoretical framework above. In particular, we estimate the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing rates and allow the effects of insurance on HIV testing to differ by risk status. We also examine the extent to which the introduction of HAART affects the link between insurance and HIV testing. Finally, we allow the effects of HAART to vary by risk status. In summary, we aim to answer the following questions:
(1) How does health insurance affect HIV testing? And how does the effect of insurance on HIV testing differ for high risk and low risk individuals?
(2) How does the introduction of HAART affect the impact of insurance on HIV testing? And how is this effect of HAART different for high risk people and low risk individuals?
Empirical Strategy
We observe two discrete outcomes: having health insurance and undergoing HIV testing, which take the form of . In a bivariate probit model these outcomes are modeled using a latent variable approach where we only observe whether the latent variable is above or below zero.
We use a Recursive Bivariate Probit model to estimate the causal effect of health insurance coverage on the probability of testing for HIV. The recursive structure builds on a first equation for the potentially endogenous dummy-insurance status and a second equation determining the outcome of interest-decision to undergo an HIV test. We estimate separate models from each risk group .
We discuss the empirical definitions of the risk group in the data section of the paper.
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In (1) Our model belongs to the general class of simultaneous equation models with both continuous and discrete endogenous variables introduced by Heckman (1978) . In this general context, Heckman (1978) argues that only the full rank of the regressor matrix is needed to identify the parameters. However, Maddala (1983) asserts that the parameters of the second equation are not identified if there are no exclusion restrictions on the exogenous variables. However, Wilde (2000) shows that this assertion is not true and exclusion restrictions are not necessary for identification as long as each equation contains at least one exogenous regressor, i.e., theoretical identification does not require exclusion restrictions if there is sufficient variation in the data.
Although the model is identified by its non-linear functional form even in the absence of exclusion restrictions, identification by functional form relies heavily on the assumption of bivariate normality. Under distributional misspecification, exclusion restrictions might help to make the estimation results more robust. In a Monte Carlo simulation study, Chiara Monfardini and Radice (2008) show that, even under correct distributional assumptions, the lack of availability of a valid instrument will make exogeneity tests unreliable.
It is therefore a common practice to impose exclusion restrictions to improve identification. These exclusion restrictions (instruments), , should be causally linked to insurance status and should affect HIV testing only through their effect on insurance status. We use expansion in Medicaid coverage and changes in the distribution of firm size within states overtime as instruments for insurance coverage. They are discussed in greater detail in the data section.
The 
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Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS)
BRFSS is a population-based, random-digit-dialed telephone survey administered yearly to a representative sample of non-institutionalized U.S. adults aged 18 years and older that inquires about various health behaviors associated with premature morbidity and mortality. The survey has been approved by institutional review boards in each state, and participants provide oral consent to be interviewed.
Interviewers record answers using computer software. We used data from 1993 to 2002 surveys. Below we describe the variables from BRFSS that we used in our analysis.
HIV Testing of Adults Under 65
We measured HIV testing as the self-report of an HIV test within 12 months before the interview. The HIV/AIDS section of the current BRFSS core questionnaire collects the following information: whether the respondent was ever tested for HIV and, if so, the month and year of the last test and the facility where last tested.
Respondents were coded as having tested (tested = 1) if they reported that they tested for HIV sometime in the year preceding their interview date; we assigned a value of 0 otherwise. Respondents who had never been tested for HIV were coded as 0 because they had not been tested in the preceding 1 year. 
HIV-Risk Group: Self-perceived HIV Risk
Instruments
We used the two sets of instruments for insurance choice -Medicaid expansion and firm size distribution. These instruments are similar to those used by Bhattacharya, Goldman and Sood (2003) In particular, we use data on the distribution of firm size in every state and year to construct two instruments at the state-year level (Bhattacharya, et al. 2009 ): (1) the percentage of workers employed in firms with 100 to 499 employees, and (2) the percentage of workers employed in firms with 500 or more employees. These instruments are strong predictors of insurance coverage as large firms are much more likely to offer insurance coverage. For example, data from the 2008 Current Population Survey show that 32% of workers in firms with less than 25 employees are uninsured and only 13% of workers in private firms with more than 500 employees are uninsured. For our analysis we interact these instruments with poverty status as prior research suggests that the effects of availability of insurance on take-up of insurance might vary with income (Ham et al. 2011) The proposed instruments are valid under two conditions. First, they should be strong predictors of insurance coverage. Second, they should affect HIV testing only through their effect on insurance choice. In the next section, we show that the instruments are strong predictors of insurance coverage. The second assumption cannot be directly tested. However, it seems unlikely that changes in firm size distribution within a state or timing of adoption of 1115 waivers (our models have state fixed effects) would be related to HIV testing, except through insurance coverage. However, one concern is that variation in our instruments might be correlated with state economic conditions or other characteristics correlated with HIV testing. To address this concern, Table 1 compares five important state characteristics (unemployment rate, disposable income, poverty rate, percent White and age distribution of population) between 19 states with an increasing proportion of 1115 waiver beneficiaries over total Medicaid beneficiaries from 1993 to 2003 with beneficiaries over the total Medicaid beneficiaries in the same period. We find that not only are the levels of these characteristics similar across these two types of states but trends in these characteristics over the sample period are also similar. This allays concerns about systematic differences in characteristics of states with high versus low values of our instrumental variable for public insurance coverage. Table 2 compares the same state characteristics between 41 states with rising proportion of employment in medium and large firms from 1993 to 2003 to 9 states with falling proportion of employment in medium and large firms from 1993 to 2003. Again, the data show little difference in levels or trends in state characteristics across states with high versus low values of our instrumental variable for private insurance coverage. In another similar test of validity of our instrumental variables, we estimate alternate models which include these state-year level variables as covariates. We find that our results are robust to the inclusion of these state-year level variables as covariates. The results section provides more details on this specification test. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the analytic sample. The average age of respondents is 40 years and slightly more than half the respondents are females.
Results
About 60% have some college education, more than a third have incomes below 200% of the federal poverty line and 85% have health insurance. Overall, about 16% of the respondents report testing for HIV in the previous year and not surprisingly, the testing rate among high risk individuals is 10 percentage points higher than the rate among low risk individuals. High risk individuals also are less likely to be white, female, and single. High risk individuals have similar insurance coverage and education. percentage points in the post-HAART period. We do not observe a similar increase in the marginal effect of insurance for the low risk group. In fact, the evidence suggests a modest decrease in the effect of insurance on HIV testing for the low risk group.
Instrument Validity
The results in Table 4 suggest that our instrumental variables are statistically significantly related to insurance coverage. Firm size distribution is a strong predictor of insurance coverage for the low risk population and Medicaid eligibility expansion is a strong predictor of insurance coverage for high risk population. We also find that availability of both public and private employer provided insurance has a stronger effect on insurance coverage for poor rather than rich households. In both the high risk and low risk models the instruments are jointly significant with a Chi-2 statistic of 18 (p-value = 0.0062) and 42.84 (pvalue = 0.0000) respectively.
Since our instruments vary at the state year level, one concern is that they might be correlated with other state year level determinants of HIV testing. To address this concern, Tables 6 and 7 reports results from models that include additional state-year level covariates. The additional covariates are poverty rate, unemployment rate, per capita income and population age structure. The results are robust to the inclusion of these state controls. As before, we find that health insurance increases the likelihood of testing for HIV and that the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing are larger for the high risk group. Finally, we also find that the advent of HAART increases the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing for the high risk population but not for the low risk population.
Finally, in a second indirect test of instrument validity, we checked the robustness of our results to the inclusion or exclusion of certain sets of instruments. This test is in the spirit of the Hausman over-identification test and is based on the principle that if all our instruments are valid then the estimates obtained by using only a subset of instruments should differ only as a result of sampling error (Hausman 1978) . Thus, for this test we estimated two different sets of models. The first set of models only used the instruments related to availability of private insurance and the second set of models only used the instruments related to availability of public insurance. The results from both these sets of models were virtually identical to the model that used both sets of instruments. Thus, these results also suggest that our instruments are valid.
Conclusions
In this paper we analyzed the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing behavior and how this link between testing and insurance coverage changed with HIV treatment innovations. The results suggest that (a) insurance coverage increases HIV testing among both the high risk and low risk populations (b) insurance has larger effects on HIV testing for the high risk population, and (c) the advent of effective HIV treatment increased the effects of insurance coverage on HIV testing for high risk group.
Overall these results suggest that providing insurance or subsidized treatment can be an effective strategy for increasing HIV testing rates. These results have important implication for developing economies which are considering subsidizing treatment and for developed economies like the U.S. where budget pressures might force several states to reduce the generosity of public insurance coverage for HIV.
The results suggest that providing subsidized treatment not only improves the health of the infected but also has important effects on the dynamics of the HIV epidemic.
Prior research suggests that knowing one's HIV status can reduce risky sexual activity. For example, a meta-analytic review of published research from1985 to 1997 found that after testing and counseling, HIV positive participants reduced unprotected intercourse and increased condom use. A more recent review (Gary Marks, et al. 2005) found that the prevalence of high-risk sexual behavior is reduced substantially after people become aware they are HIV+. Following these findings, Marks et al. (2006) estimate the proportion of sexual transmission of HIV attributable to HIV-positive aware and unaware persons in the USA. They found that the transmission rate from the unaware group was 3.5 times that of the aware group.
Similarly, Thornton (2008) found in an experiment in rural Malawi that sexually active HIV-positive individuals who learned their results are three times more likely to purchase condoms two months later than sexually active HIV-positive individuals who did not learn their results. These prior studies indicate increased HIV testing can potentially have a large impact on HIV transmission. Juxtaposing these results from the prior literature with the results from this study suggest that insurance coverage might reduce risky sexual behavior and reduce the spread of HIV. Notes:
We calculate the marginal effects of health insurance on HIV testing in both pre-HAART era and post-HAART era using the following formula. 
